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SUPREME NEGLECT OF TEXT AND HISTORY
William Michael Treanor*
How TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
By Richard A . Epstein. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press. 2008. Pp. xiv, 1 69. $ 19.95 .
SUPREME NEGLECT:
PRIVATE PROPERTY.

INTRODUCTION

2
'
Since his classic book Takings appeared in 1 985, Richard Epstein's
ideas have profoundly shaped debate about the Fifth Amendment's Takings
3
Clause to a degree that no other scholar can even begin to approach. His
broad, original, and stunningly ambitious reading of the clause has power
fully influenced thinking in academia, in the judiciary, and in the political
arena. The firestorm of controversy that followed the Supreme Court's re
cent decision in Keio-in which the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a municipal urban renewal plan that displaced long-time
4
homeowners and conveyed their land to developers -is in critical part a
testament to the way in which the intellectual framework and normative ar
guments pioneered and championed by Professor Epstein have entered, not
just the mainstream of legal thought, but the mainstream of politics.
In Supreme Neglect, Epstein has produced a clear and elegant synthesis
of his lifetime of thinking about the Takings Clause and, more broadly,
about the role of property in our constitutional system. In a book con
sciously aimed at a popular audience (p. xvii), Epstein advances his view
that strong protection for private property must be a core value of our consti
tutional system because that was the conception of the Framers, because the
constitutional text dictates such protection, and because strong protection
for private property safeguards liberty and advances general economic well
being. For Epstein, the Takings Clause is the Constitution's primary mecha
nism for protecting private property against government overreaching. He
argues that, if courts read the clause correctly, they will not only invalidate
much land-use regulation, the area involved in most takings litigation today,
but also the statutory regimes that create the modern regulatory state. In es
sence, for Epstein, the Takings Clause bars government from acting in ways
*

Dean and Paul Fuller Professor, Fordham Law School.

I.

RICHARD A . EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DO
MAIN ( 1 985) [hereinafter TAKINGS].
2.
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Director, Law and
Economics Program, The University of Chicago Law School.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. V ( [N] or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
"

4.

Keio v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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that diminish the value of private property (with the exception of a highly
constrained category of police-power regulations).
Under modem Supreme Court caselaw, the Takings Clause constrains
government actions in two ways. First, it bars the government from physi
cally "taking" private property (as when it uses the power of eminent
domain to acquire property for schools or roads) unless compensation is
6
5
provided and unless the taking is for a public benefit. Second, it prevents
7
"regulatory takings"-regulations that go "too far" in diminishing the value
of private property without providing compensation. Although Supreme
Court decisions do not reflect a consistent position on precisely when regu
lations go so "far" in diminishing value as to constitute a taking, only
8
dramatic diminutions in value have been found to go "too far."
Epstein sees the clause as a dramatically more powerful limitation on
government. According to Epstein, the Takings Clause is a "twelve-word
distillation of social contract political theory" (p. 34). The just
compensation principle that the clause embraces ensures that the individual
will not suffer when his or her property is taken. Central to Epstein's posi
tion are the notion that "[t]he use of compensation . . . prevents any single
individual or small group from being 'singled out' for special adverse treat
ment, for the cash paid is meant to be a perfect equivalent of the property
surrendered" (p. 32) and his belief that "forced transactions" resulting from
"the use of state power . . . should yield proportionate gains to all individu
als" (pp. 32-33). This principle of proportionate gain accords with "intuitive
grounds of fairness" (p. 33). It also promotes efficiency, a point on which
Epstein places great stress:
Forcing the government to supply proportionate gains necessarily shrinks
the level of factional intrigue. . . . [S]truggles [to win a disproportionate
share of the gain from governmental actions] cost a lot of time and money
to wage, generating backstabbing and conflict along the way. The com
bined effect of these political maneuvers is to eliminate much of the . . .
gain that the social project originally promised. The proration requirement
offers an effective way to counter that risk . . . . (p. 33)
Epstein applies this principle of proportionate gain to a wide range of doc
trinal areas. He would, for example, carefully scrutinize government actions
to determine whether they satisfy the "public use" requirement of the Tak
ings Clause, rather than applying the deferential standard of review of
5.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 4 1 9 ( 1982).

6.

Keio, 545 U.S. 469. The public benefit standard is, in practice, easily satisfied.

7.

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 4 1 5 ( 1 922).

8. For an analysis of Mahon, see William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reas
sessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 8 1 3 ( 1 998). For more recent cases involving
regulatory takings, see Penn Central Transponation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 1 04 ( 1 978), a
decision upholding the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark and the leading example
of a deferential view of the constitutionality of government regulations, and Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1 003 ( 1 992), a decision finding beachfront regulation to a be a taking
the leading example of a decision reflecting a more aggressive standard. For further discussion, see
infra Part II.
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"public use" reflected i n the Court's decision i n Keto. Even when compensa
tion is provided, takings to advance an urban renewal project would pass
constitutional muster "only when the loss in subjective value is small and
the locational necessities are great" (p. 85). He argues that rent control is
unconstitutional, as well, because of its disproportionate impact, benefiting
current renters while disadvantaging everyone else (p. 73). The Supreme
9
Court's determination in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. that zoning
is constitutional similarly runs afoul of the proportionate-advantage rule,
since the zoning ordinance that the Court upheld made some property own
ers big winners and others big losers (pp. 1 17-1 9). Endangered species
legislation also runs afoul of the Takings Clause because such legislation
"converts the discovery of any valuable species on private lands from a
source of new wealth to its owner into a mortal threat to the land's produc
tivity" (pp. 1 3 3-34). To take yet another example, progressive taxation
(definitionally) also fails to pass muster under the principle of proportionate
gain (pp. 1 67-68).
Epstein's vision of the Takings Clause thus narrowly circumscribes gov
ernmental action. He allows government to prevent property owners from
engaging in common law nuisances since common law nuisance law re
flected the principle of reciprocity: "each person will gain more from these
restrictions imposed on others than he will suffer when like restrictions are
imposed on him" (p. 23). Thus, the regulation is permissible because it
benefits property owners in general. He also allows rate regulation to the
extent it is necessary to end monopoly profits: rate regulation permissibly
limits "the natural monopolist [such as the railroad owner] to competitive
prices" (p. 1 5 1 ). Here, regulation is permissible to the extent it addresses a
situation of market failure. In general, however, compensation is mandated
if the individual has not gained proportionally from governmental action,
and the strict public-use requirement bars some governmental actions even
when compensation is paid.
The real question posed by the book, however, is not what the propor
tionate-gain approach entails, but whether it is constitutionally mandated.
Epstein makes two arguments here. One argument is historical: he claims
that the Takings Clause should be understood to embody the Founders' con
ception of the inviolability of private property. The second argument is
textual: he contends that a proper reading of the words of the clause would
lead courts to the view that government cannot diminish property value (ex
cept in very limited circumstances). The remainder of this Review will be
devoted to these arguments. I will argue that proper regard for the Framers'
conception and constitutional text-the two primary anchors of Epstein's
theory-leads to a limited amount of judicial protection for private property;
original understanding and constitutional text indicate that the purpose of
the Takings Clause is simply to provide compensation in cases of govern
ment seizure of property, a position dramatically different from Epstein's.
More broadly, if one were to apply the text according to the original
9.

272 U.S. 365 ( 1926).
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meaning of the words or to follow the concrete understanding of the found
ing generation, one would reject not only Epstein's approach to the clause,
but the entire modem regulatory-takings doctrine.
I. H ISTORY AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
With respect to history, Epstein 's account is a story of decline. The sub
title itself, "How to Revive Constitutional Protection for Private Property,"
embodies the notion that we have lost what we once had-adequate protec
tion for private property-and that we must recover what we have lost. The
halcyon days were the days of the Framers, the moment in which we de
parted from the original understanding was the New Deal, and the culprit
was the Supreme Court. It is the Court's disregard of the Framers' vision
that is the "Supreme Neglect" the book addresses and seeks to remedy.
This point-that the Framers put forth a Constitution that provided
strong protection for private property, while the New Deal Supreme Court
led us astray-is announced at the very beginning of the book in Professor
Geoffrey Stone's Editor's Note: "Over the past seventy years, the Supreme
Court has abandoned the strong version of the takings clause championed by
the framers of the Fifth Amendment in favor of the much weaker version of
the clause advocated by early twentieth-century Progressives and supporters
of the New Deal" (p. xii). Epstein restates the point in his autobiographical
preface, in which he describes how, at the outset of his career, he came to be
interested in the Takings Clause:
When I completed my legal studies in the United States, the study of
American constitutional law loomed large. Immediately, I was struck with
the major transformation from the property-protective regime that had
been championed by the framers of our Constitution to the weak property
regimes championed by the Progressive politics of the early twentieth cen
tury, which were turned into constitutional law during the New Deal.
(p. xvi)
He returns to the point in his Introduction as he states the purpose of the
book:
Our founding fathers had a keen appreciation of the central role of private
property in social life, which is why they included the "takings clause" in
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . . The evident
partiality for limited government that animates that provision has not held
firm throughout our nation's history. Indeed the revolution of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal was made possible by the conscious choice of the
United States Supreme Court to make sure the takings clause did not ham
per or overturn any of Roosevelt's comprehensive legislative reforms,
which imposed greater government control over the nation's economic ac
tivity. . . . The purpose of the book is to offer a roadmap for the revival of
property rights in the United States and for the social improvement that
this constitutional change should usher in. (p. 2)
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Epstein thus proclaims with enthusiasm and vigor that recovering the vi
sion of the Framers is his basic mission. And yet the actual Framers are
almost literally absent from the book. To be precise, the following is a com
plete enumeration of all references to individual Framers in Supreme
Neglect: Madison is mentioned once, in passing. Madison appears as the
sole American (along with four Scottish and English writers) on a list of the
"key writers who set the intellectual framework for our Constitution . . .
[who] all treated private property as a bulwark of the individual against the
10
arbitrary power of the state." That's it. There is no discussion of Madison's
thought, not even a mention of anyone else involved in drafting or ratifying
the Constitution or the Takings Clause, no discussion of drafting or ratifying
history, and no mention of the circumstances that gave rise to the Takings
Clause. Epstein has fairly extensive discussions of the role of private prop
erty in the thinking of John Locke (pp. 6, 17-18, 27, 29-30), William
Blackstone (pp. 6, 1 8-19, 90), David Hume (pp. 6, 27), and Adam Smith
(pp. 6, 18, 30, 3 1 , 1 67), but (with the exception of including Madison's
name on a list), no Americans figure in Epstein's analysis of the original
understanding.
The ideological background of the founding generation was complex.
While thinkers such as Locke and Blackstone were part of that background,
so was a republican worldview, descended from English opposition thought,
in which the purpose of the state was seen as promoting virtue and in which
11
the individual pursuit of self-interest was decried. As the Founders thought
through questions of private property, this approach often manifested itself.
Thus, at the Constitutional Convention, delegate John Dickinson declared
that he "doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a
veneration for wealth" and "had always understood that a veneration for
12
poverty [and] virtue[] were the objects of republican encouragement."
Similarly, Benjamin Franklin observed, "Private Property . . . is a Creature
of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessi
13
ties shall require it, even to its last Farthing." Given the competing
ideological influences shaping the thought of the founding generation,
Epstein's account is irretrievably flawed because he simply cites one set of
influences (and does so in a very broad-brush way) while ignoring both
competing influences and the way in which the Founders worked through
concrete problems.

1 0. P. 6. The others who established the intellectual framework for the Constitution are John
Locke, David Hume, William Blackstone, and Adam Smith. P. 6.
1 1 . For further discussion of the argument briefly advanced here, see William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.
R EV. 782, 8 1 9-25 ( 1 995).
1 2 . 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 787, at 1 1 8, 123 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1 966).
1 3 . Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of
Pennsylvania ( 1 789), in IO THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (Albert Henry Smyth
ed., 1 907).
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The omission of analysis of the Framers is not a product of the fact that

Supreme Neglect is a quasi-popular book. Rather, it reflects Epstein's disre
gard for what the Framers thought (although he claims to be their
champion). Takings, his primary scholarly book on the Takings Clause,
takes precisely the same approach as Supreme Neglect. It has a chapter fo
cusing on the views of specific British thinkers-"Hobbesian Man, Lockean
14
World" -yet Hamilton is the only Founder to earn even a mention, and the
15
reference to him is in passing and not concerned with the Takings Clause.
Looking at English and Scottish thinkers associated with classic liberalism
(with Locke having the pride of place), Epstein finds historical basis for a
view of property that includes the "rights to use, transform, develop, con
sume, or dispose of property," as well as the right of "exclusion" (p. 20), and
that has the dual goals of serving "as a bulwark of the individual against the
arbitrary power of the state" (p. 6) and promoting economic gain (p. 1 9).
Yet, as Epstein develops his historical claims, there is no attention to how
Americans of the founding generation and the generations before the found
ing grappled with both the level of protection to be afforded private property
and the limits on that protection. I am willing to accept that Locke was a
strong champion of private property (although the extent of the protection
he would have afforded private property is a subject of debate among aca
demics). That fact, however, is of limited relevance to an inquiry about the
original understanding of the Takings Clause. Epstein's originalism is irre
trievably flawed because it is originalism without Americans.
Epstein might respond to this critique by arguing that his concern is with
the original meaning of the text, not the original understanding of the people
16
who wrote and adopted that text, and that his approach is textualist. That
claim, however, is belied by his repeated invocation of the Framers-which
reflects the view that what they thought matters and that he is claiming their
mantle-and by his invocation of Locke, Hume, and other British think
ers-which suggests that background is relevant to understanding text.
Indeed, Epstein writes: "[T]o figure out what these words [of the Takings
Clause] mean[,] we must tum to extrinsic material that runs the gamut from
popular usage to historical practice and learned commentary" (p. 5). But his
use of background understanding omits centrally important evidence.
While Epstein's vision of the Takings Clause bars both physical seizures
of property by the government and regulations that diminish the value of
property, the few precursors to the Takings Clause were all concerned only
with physical seizure. Even this point should be placed in context: Takings
clauses were generally not present in colonial-era documents of govern
ment, and, prior to the Fifth Amendment, there were many instances of

14.

TAKINGS, supra note I, at 7- 1 8.

15.

Id. at 1 7.

1 6. See, e.g. , p. 6 ("In dealing with the takings clause, we have to track the text."); p. 39
("[T]he acid test is . . . [whether courts] have . . . read constitutional terms in accord with their ordi
nary usage at the time of their adoption, as elucidated-and here is the rub-by traditional
principles of interpretation.").
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17
uncompensated takings. The clauses that existed were limited in scope to
seizure. The Magna Carta prohibits a crown official from "tak[ing] the com
18
or other chattels unless he pays on the spot cash for them." Similarly, the
only colonial charter to have a takings provision was the 1 641 Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, which provides that "[n]o man[']s Cattel or goods of what
kinde soever shall be pressed or taken for any publique use or service" with
19
out compensation. The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, which
John Locke drafted but which never fully went into effect, was also concerned
with physical seizures, requiring compensation when the colonial government
0
built structures and constructed highways on private land. 2
The handful of revolutionary-era takings clauses were also limited to
physical seizures. Vermont's 1 777 Constitution provided "[t]hat private
property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it;
nevertheless, whenever any particular man's property is taken for the use of
21
the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money." While we
have no legislative history for the clause, the contextual evidence from
Vermont's history sheds light on the drafters ' intent. Vermonters had de
clared their independence from New York after the New York governor had
invalidated the New Hampshire land claims on which most land claims in
22
what became Vermont rested. The Vermonters were thus rebelling because
of a government action that took away their land and gave it to others. The
takings clause ensured that, in the future, the state government could not
deprive property owners of their land in this way because it barred the state
from transferring land from one individual to another without compensa
3
2
tion.2 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1 780 4 and the Northwest
25
Ordinance of 1 78? both had takings clauses that used language suggesting

1 7.

For further discussion, see Treanor, supra note 1 1 at 787-9 1 .

1 8. KATHERINE FISCHER DREW, MAGNA CARTA 133 (2004) (translated from Latin). (Al
though the chapters of the original text were unnumbered, this chapter is conventionally numbered
28 in modem discussions of the original text.) A broader provision of the Magna Carta mandates
adequate procedure, without requiring compensation. Id. at 1 34 (chapter conventionally numbered
39) ("No free man shall be . . . disseised . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.").
1 9. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1 64 1 , § 8, reprinted in I THE COLONIAL LAWS
OF MASSACHUSETTS 29 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1 889).
20. Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina of 1 669, art. 44, reprinted in JOHN LOCKE PO
LITICAL ESSAYS, at 1 60 (Mark Goldie ed., University Cambridge Press 1 997) ( 1 669) ("The Damage
the Owner of such Lands (on or through which any such publick thing shall be made) shall receive
thereby, shall be valued, and Satisfaction made by such ways as the Grand Council shall appoint.").
21.

VT. CONST. o f 1 777, Declaration of Rights, art. 2.

22.

Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 827-30.

23.

Id.

24. MASS. CONST. of 1 780, Declaration of Rights, art. X ("[W]henever the public exigencies
require, that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a
reasonable compensation therefor.").
25. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the River Ohio
(Northwest Ordinance of 1 787), ch. 8, art . II, I Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) ( 1 789) ("[S]hould the public
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concern with impressments of goods by the military, and the relevant early
caselaw (the most relevant history) supports the reading that the clauses
26
were limited to physical seizures.
Thus, whereas Epstein pictures Framers who had a strong conception of
the inviolability of private property, the actual historical record is more nu
anced. As we have seen, most state constitutions did not bar uncompensated
takings; where there was a requirement of compensation, it was limited to
physical seizures. This does not mean that the founding generation did not
see the protection of private property as of fundamental importance. It does
mean that they were aware that government actions could affect property
and its value and that, outside of the context of physical seizures, they did
not want a bright-line rule that would prohibit important governmental ac
tions in the absence of compensation; it also means that, even in the area of
physical seizures, support for an inviolable compensation principle was lim
ited.
Not surprisingly given this background, there was no demand that a tak
ings clause be included in the Bill of Rights. Of all the clauses in the Bill of
27
Rights, it alone was not requested by a state ratifying convention.
Epstein writes: "Our founding fathers had a keen appreciation of the
central role of private property in social life, which is why they included the
'takings clause' in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution"
(p. 2). This suggests a broad-gauged historical movement coalescing around
the necessity for the clause, but the reason why we have a takings clause is
simpler: when he proposed the Bill of Rights, Madison included a takings
clause. There is no surviving history of debate among members of the Con
gress or the state legislatures about what the clause meant. Perhaps the most
relevant evidence is found in the first constitutional law treatise, in which St.
George Tucker in 1 803 suggested that the clause "was probably intended to
restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the
army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently prac
28
tised during the revolutionary war." Madison, in his private writings,
indicated another area in which the clause would have effect: it would re-

exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.").
26. Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 1 32-33 (La. 1 8 1 6) (holding that the Northwest
Ordinance only mandated compensation when a person's property or services were used to advance
the war effort); Callender v. Marsh, 1 8 Mass. (I Pick.) 4 1 8 ( 1 823) (requiring no compensation for
consequential damages); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. ( 1 1 Met.) 55 ( 1 846) (requiring no
compensation to owner barred from taking sand and gravel from his land). For further discussion,
see Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 830-32.
27. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL Of RIGHTS: AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 1 6 1 -63
( 1 957) (listing sources for the amendments).
28. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Appendix to I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES I , 305-06
(St. George Tucker, ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1 803). As Tucker
suggested, property owners whose goods had been impressed by the military during the Revolution
ary War did not have a judicially enforceable right to compensation for these losses. See Respublica
v. Sparhawk, I Dall. 357, 362-63 (Pa. 1 788) (finding no right to compensation for goods seized by
the military during Revolutionary War).
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29
quire compensation if the national government were to abolish slavery.
30
Neither writing suggests that the clause covered regulations.
The early caselaw on the just-compensation principle, primarily in state
courts interpreting state constitutions, is to the same effect: the clause did
31
not encompass regulations. Treatise writer Theodore Sedgwick wrote in
1 857: "It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under
this clause, the property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the
32
word." The protection provided in federal courts was limited in another
way. Until after the Civil War, only Congress, and not the courts, could re
33
solve claims for takings payments.
In sum, one of Epstein's central claims-that he is reviving the Foun
ders' vision of the Takings Clause-is completely unfounded. His book's
textual argument is equally flawed and is considered next in Part II.
II. ThXTUALISM AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Epstein states that following the text of the clause is an imperative: "In
dealing with the takings clause, we have to track the text" (p. 6). His textual
ist argument begins, quite correctly, by looking at constitutional text and the
key terms of the Takings Clause: "What do we mean by 'private property' ?
How i s it 'taken' ? What i s 'just compensation ' ? And what i s a taking 'for
public use ' ?" (p. 39).
So far, so good. A textualist approach to the Takings Clause that answers
these questions leads to the same place as the originalist approach outlined
above: regulation falls outside of the scope of the Takings Clause. While the
government has to pay the property owner when it physically "takes" her
property for a public use, in contrast, it does not have to pay compensation
when it bars her from using it in a certain way because, under both eight
34
eenth-century and current usages, it has not "taken" her "property." To use
an example I have used before: If I tell my daughter Katherine that she

29. Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1 8 1 9), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER 3 1 5 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 198 1 ). For further discussion, see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
30. See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1 792, reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1 983) (using the Takings
Clause principle that no property "shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnifica
tion to the owner" as reflecting support for "the inviolability of property" and criticizing
Hamiltonian economic policies for their failure to reflect the same support for the inviolability of
property). Thus, for Madison, the clause reflected a larger principle and had significance beyond its
legal scope, which was limited to direct takings. Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 838-39.
31.

Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 792-94.

32. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 1 9 (New York, John S.
Voorhies 1 857).
33. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
From a legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA . L. REV. 625, 627-64 ( 1 985).
34. For further development of this argument, see William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008).
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cannot play with her ball in the apartment, she will not accuse me of having
"taken" her ball (or of having "taken" anything else, for that matter). She
has been deprived of something of value to her: there is nothing she likes
better than playing ball in the apartment. But we don't think of this prohibi
tion as a taking of property. The Supreme Court has recognized the
regulatory-takings doctrine for over one hundred years, but a committed
textualist, like a committed originalist, sees this line of precedent as an error.
Epstein's textualism, however, ultimately rests on non-textual concerns
and moves him dramatically away from the plain-language textual approach
above. After enumerating the four questions addressing the "key terms of
the takings clause" (p. 39)-"What do we mean by 'private property' ? How
is it 'taken'? What is 'just compensation' ? And what is a taking ' for public
use' ?" (p. 39)-he adds "it would be a grievous error to assume that these
textual questions, critical as they are to the overall enterprise, constitute the
entire picture" (p. 39). He then introduces "two key nontextual principles of
interpretation" (p. 39) which he says are "wholly consistent with the rule of
law . . . [and] an integral part of a uniform interpretive tradition since the
days of the Bible" (p. 39).
One is 'justification": the government can intervene to prevent harms
without providing compensation; Epstein conceives of this power narrowly,
equating it with unauthorized entry onto private property and nuisances (p.
42). More significant for Epstein's analysis is the second non-textual factor,
the "anticircumvention principle": the government cannot "circumvent [the
prohibition's] literal language in ways that undermine its broad purpose" (p.
40). This non-textual principle is the key to Epstein's conception of the Tak
ings Clause exercise.
In a critical passage on anticircumvention and its scope, Epstein notes
the textualist argument that "[i]n its ordinary sense, the term 'taking' re
quires dispossession of property" (p. 98). His response is not to counter with
a textualist argument of his own, but to move through a series of analogies.
First, he observes that "the categorical refusal to compensate regulatory tak
ings has been rejected even by writers who think that the historical and
textual evidence confines the takings clause to physical occupations" (p.
98). This is a surprising argument for a scholar such as Epstein to make: the
positions he advances were novel when he made them, so a claim that no
one today would limit the Takings Clause to physical occupations should
not have a great weight with him, if that is what the text and history (but not
the precedent) would warrant.
In any event, he then moves through a series of analytic steps that lead
him to his broad reading of the clause. He offers the example of a regulation
that takes away all the property owner's rights except the right to exclude.
"Surely, courts should invoke the anticircumvention principle to stop this
abuse, for nothing in principle requires or allows for the artificial separation
of occupation from land-use regulation, when both wipe out [the property
owner's] value in his land" (p. 99). In other words, a regulation that is tan
tamount to a physical occupation should be treated the same as a physical
occupation would be: compensation is owed. He then moves from a
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regulation affecting one property owner to a regulation of broader effect and
argues that they should be treated the same way: "the law cannot erect an
iron wall between restrictions directed toward a single person and those di
rected toward many people" (p. 99). Earlier in the book, Epstein had made
the argument that government acts that affect a particular right in the bundle
of sticks are as much takings as acts that affect all of them: "[I]magine that
the bundle of rights in a piece of land-in space, over time, and against
neighbors-is a salami. Any slice of that salami is still salami, so that the
state has to pay for each slice of salami it cuts for itself, no matter how thin"
(p. 46). This same approach is now applied in the regulatory-takings con
text: "[T]he central analytical inquiry asks whether the pattern of benefits
generated by the government matches its dislocations, be they large or
small. If it does, the measure is constitutional. If not, then it is prima facie
unconstitutional" (p. 99). Everything else Epstein argues for follows. Gov
ernment acts under which some individual or group of individuals does not
receive proportionate gain-whether zoning rules, or environmental statutes,
or progressive taxation, or any of a host of other statutes-are unconstitu
tional.
It is hard to think of a better example of the tail wagging the dog. As the
historical discussion above indicates, the Takings Clause did not originally
apply to regulations, and the text itself is clear: the government cannot
physically take your property for a public use without paying for it. The
clause itself was sought by no one other than Madison, and, although there
is no legislative history for it, the leading constitutional scholar of the early
republic, St. George Tucker, thought it was intended to require compensa
35
tion when the military impressed goods during wartime. But, by deftly
moving through a series of analogies, Epstein transforms this clause of lim
ited scope into a prohibition on the regulatory state.
III. TE XT, HISTORY, AND THE S UPREME COURT
Epstein's thesis is that the Supreme Court has "supreme[ly] neglect[ed]"
the history and text of the Takings Clause. In the previous sections, I have
shown that, in fact, Epstein himself disregards the text as the founding gen
eration understood it and he disregards history. At a fundamental level,
however, I agree with Epstein: I also think the Supreme Court caselaw de
parts from the text and the history, and in this final section I would like to
explore that insight, very briefly.
The Supreme Court first embraced the position that a regulation could
36
be a taking in 1 898 in the case of Smyth v. Ames. The central controversy
in modem caselaw concerns how broadly to read the regulatory-takings doc
trine. The leading pro-regulation case is Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, in which a closely divided Court upheld a New York City
35.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

36.
1 69 U.S. 466 ( 1 898). For discussion of Smyth and its place in the caselaw, see Treanor,
supra note 8, at 837.
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land-use regulation that cost the owners of Grand Central Station a mini
mum of three million dollars a year (and gave them in return only
37
transferable development rights of indeterminate value). The leading case
reflecting a much more searching analysis is Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. 38 While the regulation at stake in Lucas deprived the prop
erty owner of all value of his property, Justice Scalia's opinion indicates that
some regulations taking all value from discrete property interests
39
individual sticks in the bundle of sticks-will be compensable takings. As
we have seen, Epstein would push the doctrine of regulatory takings even
further.
My textual and historical analysis above indicates that this dispute is be
side the point. Neither the text nor the history supports the view that
regulations can be takings . The text of the Takings Clause and the early his
tory limit it simply to physical seizures by the government-situations
where the government physically "takes" property by, for example, building
a road or a school on it. So, under this analysis, the whole regulatory-takings
doctrine-and the century-long line of precedent that reflects it-is a mis
take.
Of course, not everyone is an originalist or a textualist. One can legiti
mately disregard the text and the original understanding and embrace the
regulatory-takings doctrine because of respect for precedent or because she
sees the protection of private property as a fundamental value in our consti
tutional system that merits protection beyond that provided for by the text or
history. But if one applies the text in accordance with the original meaning
of the words or if she wishes to apply the concrete understandings of the
0
founding generation, she will reject the whole idea of regulatory takings.4
CONCLUSION

Supreme Neglect powerfully highlights the costs of government regula
tion and the ways in which logrolling and the power of special interests
both dissipate the benefits of government action and cause the government
to act even when the action occasions more harm than benefit. Such argu
ments can have great influence politically. At the outset of this Review, I
37. 438 U.S. 104, 1 1 6 ( 1 978) (proposed use would have provided property owner three
million dollars in rent annually); id. at 1 37 (holding that, while the transferable development right
may not have been "just compensation" if there had been a taking, they "undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken
into account in considering the impact of regulation"); see also id. at 1 4 1 , 1 5 1-52 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (questioning whether the transferable development rights were adequate compensation
and indicating that the case should have been remanded to determine the adequacy of compensa
tion).
38.

505 U.S. 1 003 ( 1 992).

39.

Id.

at 1 0 1 6 n.7.

40. Another approach would be to "translate" the underlying concerns of the founding gen
eration into a modern context. I have used this approach in arguing for a process-based approach to
the Takings Clause. Treanor, supra note 1 1 , at 873-88. That approach, however, is not a texrualist
approach or an attempt to interpret the clause to reflect the concrete understandings of the Founders.
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mentioned the outcry that followed the Supreme Court's decision in Keio: as
Epstein notes, by early 2007, thirty-four states had enacted statutes or con
stitutional provisions designed to prevent the use of urban renewal plans to
seize private property and convey it to developers (p. 3). But Supreme Ne
glect is principally a book of constitutional law, not a book of public policy,
and the metrics on which Epstein relies-history and text-dramatically
undercut his thesis. History and text indicate that the clause is concerned
only with physical seizures by the government. For more than one hundred
years, the Supreme Court has held that some regulations run afoul of the
Takings Clause. But one who embraces the constitutional commitments to
text and history that Epstein espouses should reject this line of precedent,
rather than seeking to expand it dramatically in the way that Epstein does. It
is fair to say that the modem Court's takings jurisprudence "supreme[ly]
neglect[s ]" the text and history of the Takings Clause. But the same criticism
is equally applicable to Epstein. Epstein would dramatically expand the
scope of the Takings Clause beyond that provided under current caselaw.
Serious regard for text and history would, however, dramatically move the
law in precisely the opposite direction. It would lead to rejection of the prin
ciple that regulations are takings within the meaning of the Takings Clause
and it would limit the clause to mandating compensation for physical tak
ings for public use.

